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Too Poor to Be Stewards?




Sustaining natural resource stocks, especially those underpinning 
the capacity to produce food, is key to most definitions of sustainable 
development. Yet troubling evidence has surfaced of instances where 
the rural poor were forced to sacrifice long-term sustainability for the 
sake of near-term survival (Mink 1993; Figueroa 1998). Are such cases 
special ones, or is rural poverty a driving factor in causing soil erosion, 
overgrazing, deforestation, and degradation of other natural resources? 
This chapter argues that natural resource sustainability in develop-
ing countries is not the result of a direct cause-effect relationship, but 
rather is engendered by a web of causal factors. Untangling that web 
entails separating out strands for poverty from those for location-spe-
cific natural resources, human institutions, technology, and population. 
This chapter will review the history of the poverty-environment debate, 
examine three case studies that shed light on key relationships, and, 
finally, propose policy interventions to promote the sustainability of the 
natural resources that underpin agricultural productivity.
POPULATION AND FOOD PRODUCTION: IDEAS AND
TRENDS 
The poverty-environment debate has grown from a seed planted by 
the English clergyman Thomas Malthus 200 years ago. Having studied 
the historical growth rates of population and food production, Malthus 
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(1798) wrote an essay, published anonymously by Joseph Johnson, a 
radical publisher at St. Paul’s Churchyard in London, in which he laid 
out his famous scenario for disaster: “The power of population is in-
definitely greater than the power in the earth to produce subsistence 
for man. Population, when unchecked, increases in a geometrical ratio. 
Subsistence increases only in an arithmetical ratio.” Throughout hu-
man history, war and pestilence have reined in population before the 
food supply became a constraint. But by the mid-nineteenth century, 
when a potato blight spread famine among the Irish population, killing 
one million inhabitants, current events seemed to support Malthus’ grim 
observation that food production lacked the potential to keep up with 
population.
As population growth rates took off during the period of relative 
peace after World War II, Malthusian fears again reared up. Could the 
world possibly provide for a rapidly growing population? Two affirma-
tive answers emerged during the 1960s. Based on her sweeping review 
of agricultural development worldwide, Esther Boserup (1965) found 
that rising population tended to trigger an intensification of agriculture, 
leading to higher food production from the same land. She argued that 
this was so because rising population increased demand for food, rais-
ing food prices and creating incentives for farmers to invest in boosting 
the productivity of the land by adding productive inputs, such as fertil-
izers and irrigation.
At the same time, the Rockefeller and Ford foundations were in-
vesting in new agricultural research centers in Mexico and the Philip-
pines. By the end of the 1960s, Norman Borlaug and fellow agricultural 
researchers at these locations had bred new, high-yielding varieties of 
wheat and rice, whose advent became known as the green revolution. 
Developed by traditional methods of crossing plant varieties that had 
different desired characteristics, these new varieties possessed resis-
tance to debilitating diseases like wheat rust, as well as reengineered 
plant architectures that shifted more biomass from stems and leaves 
into grain formation. In regions like the Punjab, where irrigation and 
fertilization were available, these varieties delivered spectacular yields. 
The success of the early varieties triggered a generation of investment 
in a network of publicly funded international agricultural research cen-
ters. The goal of the network was to bring productivity gains compa-
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rable to those in the Punjab to crop and livestock farmers working under 
diverse conditions around the globe.
By the 1980s the euphoria of the boom-boom days of the green 
revolution had begun to wear off. Replicating the yield gains achieved 
in developing countries in wheat, rice, and hybrid maize had proven 
more difficult to do for other crops and livestock. Moreover, even those 
more successful crops had turned out to yield significantly less when 
fertilizer and water inputs were lacking. Despite major investments 
in agronomic and socioeconomic research to understand and improve 
farm management practices, yield gains were not keeping up. To make 
matters worse, by the 1990s many developing country governments had 
cut back sharply on their agricultural research and extension services 
in response to fiscal discipline imposed by the International Monetary 
Fund. 
Today, a stark contrast has emerged between food production trends 
worldwide and food production trends in the poorest regions. Viewed 
globally, Malthus’ fears now look groundless: Food production out-
stripped population growth by 50 percent during the period 1960–2000. 
As shown in Figure 7.1, food available per capita has grown signifi-
cantly (Wiebe 2003). Indeed, the percentage of the world population 
that is food-insecure has fallen steadily. Viewed regionally, however, 
food production in the poorest parts of the developing world has not 
kept up. A Malthusian trend apparent in several disadvantaged regions 
has been most noted in sub-Saharan Africa. There, food production per 
capita eroded by 15–20 percent during the last 40 years of the century 
(Figure 7.2). Indeed, despite a shrinking percentage of food-insecure 
population globally, the absolute number of people who are at risk of 
hunger worldwide has remained troublingly stable (Figure 7.1).
How are we to reconcile persistent localized hunger with growing 
global bounty? In a world increasingly integrated by trade and com-
munication, the crux of the problem is no longer the quantity of food 
produced, but rather access to it (Runge et al. 2003). Almost a billion 
people are still too poor to acquire the food they need. Worse, they may 
feel the need to sacrifice future natural resource productivity for current 
consumption. The task of this chapter is to examine why poverty en-
dures in many rural regions of the tropics, and particularly how poverty 
is linked to natural resource degradation.
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DESPITE TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE, WHY DOES 
MALTHUS STILL LOOK PARTLY CORRECT?
The persistence of pockets of extreme poverty raises questions about 
the population–food production relationship. Why was Malthus wrong 
at a global level yet seemingly right in some regions of the globe? And, 
are the trends we observe inevitable?
The place to begin is the fundamental ratio of food productivity: 
the rate of change in food production divided by the rate of change in 
population. Malthus clearly failed to anticipate the sensitivity of the 
numerator (rate of change in food production) to technological change. 
Figure 7.1  Rise in World Food Production Compared to Population 
Growth, 1960–2000
NOTE: Food insecurity is indicated here by chronic undernourishment.
SOURCE: Wiebe (2003), based on data from the Food and Agriculture Organization 
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Not only has technological change proven able to augment food produc-
tion dramatically, it has also proven highly responsive to relative prices. 
The powerful dynamic that Ruttan and Hayami dubbed induced innova-
tion describes how technological change is driven by shifts in relative 
prices of inputs and outputs (Hayami and Ruttan 1985). In particular, 
this dynamic has meant that when land becomes relatively scarce (e.g., 
because of rising population), technological change tends to increase 
its productivity disproportionately. Indeed, the green revolution was all 
about technological changes in plant genetics, irrigation, and fertiliza-
tion; these three areas had the combined effect of sharply increasing 
crop yield per unit of land.
But technological change is by no means automatic. First, agricul-
tural research is not automatically triggered by relative factor prices. 
This mechanism can work effectively where markets permit the intel-
lectual property from research to produce marketable products. For ex-
ample, Hayami and Ruttan (1985) document the spread of tractors in 
North America in response to the high cost of labor relative to land 
and the spread of fertilizer in Japan in response to the high cost of land 
relative to labor. But certain types of agricultural research do not gen-
erate marketable products. Private seed companies have done much to 
Figure 7.2 Food Production Per Capita in sub-Saharan Africa, 



























































advance the genetics of hybrid corn, for which newly hybridized seed 
must be purchased for planting each year, thus ensuring that the re-
search will be profitable. But the same companies have shown little 
interest in improving open-pollinated cereal crops, like rice and wheat, 
because the seed can be multiplied on-farm, so that seed is only sold 
once. Hence, public sector investment in agricultural research was cru-
cial to the original green revolution breakthroughs in rice and wheat. 
Second, overcoming the scientific hurdles is only the first step to-
ward technological change. Breakthroughs at the level of basic research 
typically then require adaptive research that will tailor them to the con-
ditions of farmers who might take up the new practices. Adult education 
and extension efforts are needed to inform farmers about the existence 
of new technologies. Then, once aware of the new possibilities, farmers 
must be willing and able to adopt them (Nowak 1992). Technological 
change ultimately occurs because farmers decide to do things differ-
ently.
From Macro to Micro: What Drives Farmer Behavior?
Given the pivotal role of individual farmers in determining how 
much food is produced, it helps to look at the world from a farmer’s 
point of view. Farmers face many choices: whether to farm at all or to 
engage in nonfarm employment; whether to grow food or a cash crop, 
like cotton or tobacco; how much land, labor, and other inputs to devote 
to each crop or animal enterprise; and what practices (technologies) to 
follow.
The choices that farmers make are shaped by their objectives and 
the resources at their command. Objectives might include being able to 
feed, clothe, and house the family, or avoiding the risk of failing to meet 
subsistence needs in case weather or pests should be bad. Defined nar-
rowly, productive resources typically include the labor and knowledge of 
family members and employees (human resources); land, water, climate, 
and biodiversity (natural resources); and equipment, buildings, and the 
means to buy or produce feed, fertilizers, pesticides, and other inputs 
(financial and manufactured resources). Some would add to this list the 
networks of social relationships and cultural-legal institutions that en-
able farmers to obtain access to needed resources (social capital). 
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Two important environmental factors affect the quality of these pro-
ductive resources. Access to economic infrastructure—notably roads, 
communications, banks, and markets that supply inputs and buy prod-
ucts—strongly affects the costs of inputs and the earnings possible from 
selling products. The biogeophysical environment—notably climate, 
soil quality, access to water, and topography—strongly affects the need 
for agricultural inputs, the potential productivity of the land, and the 
ease of selling the crops produced. 
So if technological change was responsible for increasing per capita 
food production for the world on average, why have certain regions 
been left out? Several answers fit the question. The first is that while 
technological change may be driven by relative prices (which reflect the 
relative scarcity of specific production inputs), it is equally driven by 
scientific feasibility. Raising land productivity is most feasible where 
the land is fertile, well watered, and well drained. A few fortunate places 
in the world meet these criteria naturally. In many others, they require 
investment in mineral fertilizers, irrigation, and drainage.
The regions of the world that have lagged farthest behind in food 
production are those where the economic infrastructure and the bio-
geophysical environment are least favorable. The semiarid tropics and 
highland areas, like South America’s altiplano, Africa’s Sahel and high-
land regions, and parts of Asia, face formidable geophysical constraints. 
Steep slopes in highland areas exacerbate soil erosion; they may also 
aggravate seasonal drought if sudden tropical deluges run off before 
soaking into the earth. Semiarid zones, by definition, have scant rain-
fall, less surface water, and higher risk of drought. 
The underdeveloped economic infrastructure in these same re-
gions adds up to sparser, lower quality roads that make transportation 
more expensive. Poor communication networks render communication 
slower and more expensive as well. Less developed financial institu-
tions mean that credit for purchasing inputs tends to be costlier. Distant, 
poorly equipped markets mean that more farmers have farther to go to 
buy inputs and sell products. Expensive transportation, communication, 
and credit make production inputs on the farm costlier (e.g., fertilizers, 
improved seed, irrigation, drainage); they also reduce the farm-level 
value of food produced. Farm income is reduced both by transportation 
costs and by the risk of weak market prices inherent when poor com-
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munications deprive the farmer of information on where and when to 
market the crop.
Due in large part to these biogeophysical and infrastructural disad-
vantages, not only has food productivity lagged in the semiarid tropics 
and highland regions of the world, but these regions also account for 
large numbers of impoverished people. Global malnutrition is highest 
in regions where public infrastructure is most deficient and where the 
natural endowment of biogeophysical resources is least generous. In 
these zones, farmers face severe capacity constraints to the natural and 
infrastructural resources at their command.1
TOO POOR TO BE STEWARDS?
More troubling than the failure to expand food production faster 
than population in these poor regions is evidence of diminishing in-
comes, when one considers that incomes are critical to maintaining or 
raising per-capita food consumption. Worse yet, projections 25 and 50 
years into the future using the International Model for Policy Analysis 
of Agricultural Commodities and Trade (IMPACT) suggest that regions 
like sub-Saharan Africa are likely to see significant percentage increas-
es in the number of hungry people (Runge et al. 2003, p. 31). 
For large numbers of the rural poor, agriculture offers the principal 
means to put food on the table, whether it be food that was produced 
on the farm or food bought with earnings from the farm. Farmers can 
respond to the imperative to increase food production to meet rising 
household needs with two alternative strategies: extensification or in-
tensification. Extensification refers to expansion onto new lands. Usu-
ally uncultivated lands are less suited for agricultural production than 
those lands that farmers chose to cultivate earlier. They may be less 
fertile, steeper, more susceptible to drought, or more prone to waterlog-
ging than other lands. Hence, crop yields on such marginal lands tend to 
be lower than average. Examples of extensification include felling the 
forest to open new lands or expanding from fertile valleys up onto less 
productive hillsides. While extending farming onto marginal lands may 
reduce average yield per unit of land and may also increase the riski-
ness of output, it does not undermine the productivity of lands already 
in production.
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Intensification of agricultural production can also raise food pro-
duction per capita, as documented by Boserup. Subsequent authors 
have chronicled the virtuous cycle by which initial acceleration of soil 
erosion in Machakos, Kenya, was reversed over a period of three gen-
erations, as rising food and coffee prices led farmers to invest in land 
terracing and other soil conservation measures, enabling environmen-
tal recovery and increasing food production per hectare (Tiffen, Morti-
more, and Gichuki 1994). 
Unfortunately, the “more people, less erosion” story from Macha-
kos is countered by others where productivity has continued to decline. 
If access to increased income or other sources of investment capital 
is unavailable, farmers may have no alternative but to work harder to 
scrounge more food from the same land. In their study of agricultural 
intensification in highland Rwanda, Clay, Reardon, and Kangasniemi 
(1998) distinguish between labor-led and capital-led intensification. 
Labor-led intensification occurs when farmers work the land harder to 
extract more food. In Rwanda, farmers would cease to leave fields fal-
low, cropping them continuously but without fertilization. The process 
does intensify output per hectare of land in the short term, but at the cost 
of undermining the land’s long-term productive potential by mining the 
nutrient supply in the soil. Similar patterns of shortening fallow periods 
linked to declining crop yields have been observed in other parts of the 
semiarid and highland tropics (Swinton and Quiroz 2003b).
The distinction between labor-led and capital-led intensification of-
fers one explanation for how decline and increase of agricultural land 
productivity can coexist in the world. Basing their work on a broad 
review of literature on agricultural land productivity in hilly regions, 
Templeton and Scherr offer a unified theory for how these effects are 
linked to population, as shown in Figure 7.3 (Templeton and Scherr 
1999). They contend that at first, population increases are linked to 
declining productivity. For example, bush fallow cultivation systems, 
where the land goes unplanted by the farmer except for once every five 
or more years, tend to shift to long-cycle crop rotations of three to five 
years and then to shorter rotations, but all relying on fallow to restore 
soil fertility. As the annual output gains from such labor-led intensifi-
cation diminish, rising populations in largely autarkic regions trigger 
increases in the cost of food and of the land that can produce it. These 
changes, in turn, spur capital investment in the land, which gradually 
162 Swinton
increases land productivity from a low point. The U-shape of this popu-
lation–land productivity relationship can thus encompass both the la-
bor-led (Malthus effect) and capital-led (Boserup effect) intensification 
explanations with a common population driver (Templeton and Scherr 
1999).
In a world with migration and trade, opportunities exist for people 
and goods to move about. Many poorly endowed areas with rising pop-
ulations can receive goods produced elsewhere, often at lower costs of 
production than local costs. There also exist opportunities for inhabit-
ants to migrate elsewhere for work. Migration offers an alternative to 
intensification as a means for rising populations to meet their subsis-
tence needs. But how migration affects land productivity depends on 
the specific situation: migration reduces the labor available for farming, 
which can cause low-productivity systems to stagnate at the bottom 
of the population-productivity U-curve. On the other hand, if migrant 
remittances are reinvested in the land, then capital-led intensification 
may cause land productivity to rise. The upshot of migration patterns 
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is that certain regions can find themselves trapped at the bottom of the 
U-curve when migrants move out but households choose not to invest 
in agricultural productivity (García-Barrios and García-Barrios 1990; 
Zimmerer 1993; Wiegers et al. 1999).
Where the means for investment are not available, impoverished 
farmers face a stark choice between meeting current subsistence needs 
and preserving the future productive potential of the natural resource 
base (Mink 1993). Adolfo Figueroa (1998) succinctly summed up their 
dilemma: “Given the options of producing less today . . . in exchange for 
producing more in the future, or less in the future and more in the pres-
ent, the small farmer will choose the second option.” Such a Faustian 
bargain between survival and land stewardship directly contravenes the 
goal of sustainable development, defined by the Brundtland Commis-
sion as “development that meets the needs of the present without com-
promising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” 
(World Commission on Environment and Development 1987). 
If the poor are undermining their own future survival, not to men-
tion the natural resource base shared by the rest of humanity, what does 
this mean for development policy? Should we revive Sir Arthur Lewis’s 
dictum of the 1950s that the key to economic development is to transfer 
surplus labor from unproductive agricultural employment to the pro-
ductive industrial sector (Lewis 1955; Fei and Ranis 1964)? Should 
agricultural development efforts be targeted only at less poor regions 
or poor areas endowed with abundant biogeophysical resources? Such 
policy remedies would represent an abrupt change in direction. Is there 
conclusive evidence of circumstances where there is a causal link be-
tween poverty and natural resource degradation?
THE EVIDENCE
A number of recent studies have examined the evidence of links be-
tween poverty and natural resource degradation (Wunder 2001; Barrett, 
Place, and Aboud 2002; Swinton, Escobar, and Reardon 2003). The 
great academic challenge to these studies is to control for the natural 
resource setting and the level of political-economic infrastructure. Put 
differently, does poverty affect natural resource outcomes differently in 
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the rain forest than, say, in the savanna? Does the same level of poverty 
cause different environmental outcomes in a setting with good roads 
and communications, as opposed to a more remote location? The pleth-
ora of different agricultural natural resources complicates comparisons 
even more. The quantity and quality of soils, natural forages for live-
stock, surface and ground water, and forests are just the most evident of 
the natural resource characteristics that interact closely with farming. In 
order to parse the poverty-environment puzzle more carefully, we ex-
amine illustrative cases for three agriculturally related natural resource 
degradation processes: soil erosion, overgrazing of natural rangeland, 
and soil nutrient depletion.
Soil Conservation with Terraces
Of the many natural resource management technologies that farm-
ers in developing countries have considered, terracing to conserve soil 
and runoff water offers researchers the advantage of paired cases un-
der similar geophysical and socioeconomic environments. Recent case 
studies from Peru and Ethiopia present nuanced complexity. In Peru, 
terraces have existed for over 600 years, since before the time of the In-
can empire. Many of these terraces are maintained to this day, yet others 
have been allowed to decay, despite the fact that terrace maintenance 
requires far less work than new construction. Remarkably, elsewhere in 
Peru, farmers are constructing new terraces. How can we explain this 
conundrum that in similar topographic conditions in the same country, 
farmers would display such different attitudes toward soil conserva-
tion? Efraín Gonzales de Olarte and Carolina Trivelli (1999) point out 
that the returns to investment in terracing differ markedly from one 
part of Peru to another. In more remote parts of the country like the 
south-central Andes, where low-value crops like potato and forage are 
raised, the payoff to investments in terrace construction—or even ter-
race maintenance—are unattractive. But in the Pacific valleys, where 
cash crops can be raised for export or sale in coastal cities like Lima, 
farmers have been actively building new terraces because they see an 
appealing payoff and can obtain the resources to do it (Wiegers et al. 
1999). What is the effect of poverty? The poorest farmers are the ones 
in the remote areas who have been allowing terraces to decay. Many of 
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them have been opting to invest in migration to the cities rather than 
invest in agricultural land productivity.
A continent away, Ethiopia offers a similar internal contrast. Terrac-
es that were built by local workers under food-for-work projects have 
been destroyed by some landowners, allegedly because the value of 
their soil and water conservation services could not justify the forgone 
productivity of the amount of land they took up (Shiferaw and Holden 
1999). Yet at the same time, other terraces were being built voluntarily 
in similar parts of the country. In the areas where terraces were being 
torn down, it seems that on the steepest slopes, farmers felt that the 
benefits of terraces were too modest, whereas on the most gently sloped 
land, soil bunds offered comparable benefits at lower cost of construc-
tion and lower opportunity cost of land unproductively occupied. But 
perhaps the biggest reason for destroying terraces had to do with land 
tenure security. Where farmers felt confident of passing fields on to 
their children, they were much more prone to build or preserve terraces 
than when they expected to control the fields for five years or less (Ge-
bremedhin and Swinton 2003). The effect of poverty is not apparent 
here, although households with more members are more likely to build 
terraces.
Native Forage Protection from Overgrazing
Conservation of native range forage species offers another case in 
contrasts. In Chile’s arid Region IV—the north-central part of the coun-
try—impoverished farmers grazed goats on native scrub in a common 
pool grazing area, all the while watching the digestible native vegeta-
tion slowly disappear. Because of the growth of off-farm jobs in the 
grape industry during the 1990s and a government policy of subsidizing 
small-scale irrigation, many families earned enough income to invest in 
irrigation to raise alfalfa for cattle feed. As a result, the livestock popu-
lation of these communities increased, and there also was a resurgence 
in the native forage species (Bahamondes 2003). Farmers were able 
to capitalize on attractive cattle prices because of the off-farm income 
available for investment and the government cost-sharing policy, which 
proved to be critical contributors to this success story. Although the pro-
tagonists began the decade of the 1990s as poor people and ended it the 
same, the Chilean economy had created considerable wealth at many 
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levels in the meantime. Some of that wealth allowed investments that 
relieved the population pressure on the rangeland resource base.
In contrast, both the total biomass and the biodiversity of native 
forage species in the Peruvian altiplano have declined precipitously in 
the upland villages that relied upon communal grazing. Increasingly, 
the only species available are ones that are indigestible to the sheep, 
alpacas, and llamas grazed there. Yet the livestock owners most at fault 
turn out not to be the poorest in the area, who own few animals, but the 
relatively well off, who own many (Swinton and Quiroz 2003a). Yet 
indirectly, this story still traces its causes back to a poverty root. Over 
three-quarters of the people in the altiplano lack what the Peruvian gov-
ernment defines as basic human needs. Even the relatively less poor in 
the altiplano are still poorer than the peasant farmers of Chile’s Region 
IV, whose off-farm earnings have allowed investment in irrigated for-
ages. While livestock farmers in both areas have communal grazing 
lands at hand, the herders in Peru’s altiplano are far more distant from 
major urban markets than their Chilean counterparts.
Maintenance of Soil Nutrient Levels
One additional case study of maintaining soil quality provides a nu-
anced perspective on the role of property rights. In a set of eight villages 
in the Peruvian altiplano, farmers reported declining crop yields and 
soil fertility, compared with their recollection of 20 years earlier. Very 
few used mineral fertilizers or manure amendments to restore fertil-
ity, because of a shortage of cash and the need to use dried manure for 
cooking fuel. Regression analysis highlighted the primary importance 
of fallow cycles in their crop rotation. A second stage analysis pointed 
to the importance of a cultural institution known as aynoca for influenc-
ing farmers to include fallow in crop rotations. Aynoca is the Aymara 
word for a community-level cropping pattern, whereby fields in a cer-
tain part of the village are all sown to the same crop. While the aynoca 
system originated to make it easier for villagers to take turns protect-
ing maturing crops from predators and thieves, the system has had the 
side effect of enforcing a community-level crop rotation (even though 
the individual fields are privately owned). Farmers in communities that 
had abandoned the aynoca system conceded that the system had helped 
them to maintain soil fertility, although they reported having given up 
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the aynoca system in order to have more land to plant, thus boosting 
short-term production to meet household needs (Swinton and Quiroz 
2003a).
WHY DO THE POOR SOMETIMES SUCCEED AS 
STEWARDS?
The evidence can be interpreted at two levels. Certainly the clear-
est environmental success story presented here comes from Chile, 
where capital-led intensification was made possible by off-farm earn-
ings. Likewise, terrace construction in Peru responded to capital-led 
intensification stimulated by agricultural income-earning opportunities. 
When income is available to poor farmers, whether by cross-subsidy 
from other sources or by increased income from farm sales, capital-led 
intensification is possible and may have dramatic results.
But successful natural resource stewardship also occurred among 
poor farmers without capital-led intensification. Land tenure security 
made it worthwhile for poor Ethiopian farmers to achieve largely labor-
led intensification for stone terrace construction, even though benefits 
from soil conservation would only accrue slowly over time. Likewise, 
there was evidence that the poorest do not necessarily cause the great-
est natural resource degradation, as shown by the overgrazing in the 
Peruvian altiplano by livestock owners who are relatively less poor than 
their neighbors. And the success of the aynoca system at checking soil 
fertility loss by maintaining crop rotations with fallow illustrates how a 
common property management institution is able to support sustainable 
stewardship, at least at a basic level. These examples signal possibilities 
for sustaining natural resource management at modest cost.
POLICY GUIDELINES
So if the poor are not necessarily bad stewards of natural resources, 
what factors can public policy manipulate to improve their steward-
ship—and ultimately to promote sustainable development? The an-
swers will clearly vary from place to place, based on the politico-eco-
nomic infrastructure and the natural resource setting. But the recurring 
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themes consistently relate to understanding farmers’ incentives and the 
constrained resources that limit their feasible alternatives. Policy guide-
lines are listed below, beginning with ones related to farmer incentives 
and going from least costly to most. Many are familiar recommenda-
tions for strengthening small-farm incomes, because better incomes are 
key to meeting the incentive and capacity needs for increased invest-
ment in sustainable natural resource management.
Incentive No. 1: Clear, Durable Property Rights
Clear, durable property rights are a sine qua non for longterm in-
vestments in conserving natural resources (Feder et al. 1988; Baland 
and Platteau 1996). Uncertainty about whether future benefits will ac-
crue to the person who made the investment can sharply undermine the 
expected value of returns even in a riskless world, as noted in the Ethio-
pian stone terrace investment case above. For a risk averse, impover-
ished farmer, uncertainty about poverty rights undermines even further 
the expected utility of future benefits that will accrue in exchange for 
a known, up-front cost. Although, in principle, clear property rights 
would not seem difficult to establish, in practice the great challenge is 
to ensure their diffusion and consistent enforcement. Indeed, abundant 
evidence shows that formal land titling is not equivalent to land tenure 
security, particularly in countries where changes of regime have made 
enforcement of land titling unpredictable (Gebremedhin and Swinton 
2003).2 
Incentive No. 2: Local Institutions That Support Natural Resource 
Stewardship
Farmers’ objectives are not limited to the consumption of goods by 
household members; they also include intangibles like respect earned 
from others. Local institutions for community-based natural resource 
management can be effective by using peer pressure for the common 
good. The Peruvian aynoca system of collective decision making over 
adjacent private parcels of land illustrates a mechanism by which peer 
pressure helps to enforce a community-level crop rotation that can 
maintain soil fertility at modest levels.
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Incentive No. 3: Efficient Infrastructure
An efficient system of transportation, communication, and markets 
for agricultural inputs and products can dramatically improve the ex-
pected net benefits from investments in natural resources that support 
agricultural productivity. To the extent that agricultural growth allevi-
ates poverty, which in turn alleviates natural resource degradation (e.g., 
soil erosion and soil nutrient depletion), this can advance the sustain-
ability of some resources. Ready access to a transportation network can 
sharply reduce farm-gate input costs and increase expected prices at 
the farm gate for food products.3 The same kind of effect comes from a 
reasonably dense network of markets, though market density and road 
transportation quality are substitutes. Access to roads and markets were 
key stimuli prompting construction of new terraces for soil conserva-
tion in Peru (Gonzales de Olarte and Trivelli 1999). Effective rural 
communications, not only broadcast media but also telephone systems, 
can markedly improve the timing of market transactions.4 All three of 
these infrastructural elements contribute to the net returns of agricul-
tural production, thereby augmenting the value of conserving the natu-
ral resources that make agricultural production possible.5 Indeed, the 
continued viability of capital-led intensification methods like mineral 
fertilizer and improved seed requires access to markets that offer these 
inputs (Howard et al. 1998).
One important caveat to the call for improved infrastructure is 
that while better infrastructure tends to make farming more profitable 
(hence more likely to result in available capital to invest in resource 
sustainability), better infrastructure also facilitates the spread of agri-
culture. Where agriculture competes directly with valued natural land 
uses such as forests or prairies, better infrastructure may undermine 
the sustainability of those nonagricultural natural resources (Reardon 
 and Vosti 1995; Angelsen and Kaimowitz 2001; Lee and Barrett 2001; 
Vosti et al. 2003).
Capacity No. 1: Access to Education
Human resources are the most abundant assets in poor households. 
Level of education is often associated with adoption of natural resource 
management practices, for several reasons. First, better educated farm-
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ers tend to manage their resources more efficiently, obtaining better net 
returns (Kelly et al. 2002). Better net returns imply higher shadow pric-
es for the natural resources that make production possible, and higher 
shadow prices favor conservation of those resources. Second, house-
hold members who are literate and numerate appreciate more fully the 
economic benefits and costs of natural resource management. For ex-
ample, research into cotton growers’ pesticide management in Zimba-
bwe showed that farmers who could read and understand pesticide la-
bels were less likely to suffer pesticide poisoning from overapplication 
(Maumbe and Swinton 2003). 
By contributing to skills for off-farm work, primary and second-
ary education can help with natural resource management indirectly as 
well. Migration to find work is common in much of the developing 
world. Remittances from such activities can have the same salutary ef-
fects on sustainable natural resource management as the off-farm earn-
ings of the Chilean goat owners described earlier (Bahamondes 2003).
Agricultural extension education, when effective, can rapidly affect 
farm management. Thirty years of research has highlighted the impor-
tance of participatory approaches to extension and applied agricultural 
research. One promising approach, called farmer fields schools, leads 
groups of farmers in conducting their own on-farm research. Farmers 
find such participatory research engaging, while their farming neigh-
bors learn from the demonstration effect (van de Fliert 1993).
Capacity No. 2: Access to Knowledge about Natural Resource 
Conservation
Over the past 15 years, many countries have eliminated or sharp-
ly reduced their capacity for research and outreach in agriculture and 
natural resources. None of the case studies evaluated here involves a 
significant research element because most of the countries cited have 
sharply curtailed their research and extension activities. Yet adapting 
agricultural and natural resource management research results to local 
farmers’ needs is a precondition for adoption of new methods, mak-
ing participatory research approaches especially apt (Kelly et al. 2002). 
Research and education need not be carried out by the state: nongov-
ernmental organizations in many parts of the globe are finding ways to 
meet these needs. But clearly, awareness of the benefit flows that natu-
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ral resources offer and of the alternative management practices needed 
to maintain those benefit flows is a necessary condition for adoption of 
such practices.
Capacity No. 3: Access to External Sources of Income or Credit
Capital-led intensification may not represent the only means to in-
tensify sustainably, but it has certainly proven effective again and again. 
The Chilean case illustrates how economic growth in other areas can 
create off-farm earnings by members of farm households, whose in-
come then cross-subsidizes natural resource conservation. Research 
among the cotton farmers of the Office du Niger in Mali has shown that 
cotton farmers are more likely than nearby farmers of cereal grains to 
apply fertilizer and productivity-enhancing inputs to their fields. The 
cotton crop serves both to guarantee credit for inputs and to grant ac-
cess to input markets that exist to support cotton production (Kelly et 
al. 2002). Research in Ethiopia to learn farmers’ willingness to pay for 
the benefit flows from soil conservation found that the poorest farmers 
were willing to pay the least (Holden and Shiferaw 2002). While this 
is not surprising, it reemphasizes the importance of financial capital for 
natural resource conservation investments. Even terrace construction, 
which is largely labor-led, requires the means to nourish the labor force, 
if not to pay wages on top of that.
Capacity No. 4: Emigration to Relieve Population Pressure
Frequently unmentioned is the option of relieving population pres-
sure on natural resources through migration. Large regions of the Appa-
lachian Mountains in the Eastern United States were once hardscrabble 
farms. Putting the hillsides to the plow caused severe soil erosion while 
failing to generate adequate income to meet basic needs. Migration to 
urban jobs (sometimes paired with government buyout of farms) has 
returned that region largely to forest. A similar option exists for devel-
oping countries, but the policy challenge is how to generate sufficient 
economic growth in other areas to absorb the population of marginal 
farms. The risk is that migration merely serves to create irreversible 
natural resource degradation, as when poor farmers from populous re-
gions that are suffering declining productivity move to the rain forest 
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frontier. There, they convert the forest cover into fertilizer for short-
lived gains before having to move on.
CONCLUSION
Poor farmers in the developing world are not necessarily bad stew-
ards—but nor are they typically very good ones. Like the rich, the poor 
respond to incentives. But the poor face inherent capacity constraints: 
even when they earn enough to survive, they may not earn enough to 
invest in land productivity (Reardon and Vosti 1995). Malthus failed 
to foresee the potential of technological change to keep food produc-
tion ahead of population growth. But for that potential to be realized, 
technological change typically requires investment through capital-led 
intensification. The most promising way to slow or reverse agricul-
tural natural resource deterioration is to contribute to rural incomes, 
which enables investments in sustainable intensification. Several pol-
icy approaches with this general effect are proposed, such as incen-
tive schemes to broaden the marketing margin (making farming inputs 
cheaper and products more valuable) and attempts to strengthen the 
capacity of farmers to earn income on or off the farm. Good steward-
ship can also be encouraged without capital-led intensification through 
suitably designed property rights and local institutions. But the low cost 
of these strategies is offset by their limited potential to improve natural 
resource sustainability.
The natural resource perspective that shapes much of this chapter 
focuses on resources that support agricultural productivity, notably 
soil and rangeland. Overexploitation of these resources can often be 
relieved when suitable incentives exist and when increased incomes al-
leviate constraints on the capacity to invest in future resource sustain-
ability. For natural resources that are best sustained by limiting human 
access—as in the case of native primary forests and prairies—either 
carefully designed property rights must create incentives for sustain-
able management or else there must exist income earning opportunities 
from sources unrelated to the resource to be protected, such as urban 
employment (Escobal and Aldana 2003).
The common element among all the policy alternatives presented 
here is the importance of tailoring policy to the specific socioeconomic, 
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infrastructural, and biogeophysical setting in which agricultural natu-
ral resources are managed. Ways exist to ameliorate sustainable natural 
resource management practices, from the nearly costless to those that 
make heavy demands on the public treasury. But successful policies 
require a tailored understanding of the human and natural environments 
as well as clear targeting of the natural resource objective to be met.
Notes
The author thanks Steve Vosti for helpful comments.
 1.  For a world map showing these regions, go to http://www.povertymap.net/maps 
graphics/index.cfm?data_id=23355&theme=food%20security. 
 2.  A thoughtful literature exists on various common property management struc-
tures apt for sustaining certain types of natural resources, especially biological 
resources such as native forage species and forest-dwelling species (Baland and 
Platteau 1996; Otsuka and Place 2001).
 3. “Farm gate” refers to costs and revenues as perceived from the farm. The farm-
gate cost of an input is the cost to buy it at market plus the cost of transporting it 
to the farm. Conversely, the farm-gate unit value of a product is its market price 
minus the unit cost of transport to market.
 4.  In fact, with the rapid expansion of private contracting in the developing world, 
better communications and transportation can make possible access to high-mar-
gin global markets that are totally inaccessible to impoverished farmers other-
wise. 
 5.  Improved infrastructure will certainly benefit the household. The net effect on 
natural resources is indeterminate. As noted in the case studies above, invest-
ments in natural resource conservation depend in part on the profitability of agri-
cultural products that may be produced from them (e.g., the case of stone terrace 
construction in Peru). But better infrastructure also improves access by house-
hold members to off-farm jobs, raising the opportunity cost of family labor. This 
is why research in Tigray, Ethiopia, found that farm households in less remote 
villages were less prone to construct stone terraces.
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